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Abstract
The conclusion of Swinburne’s book The existence of 
God is that “On our total evidence theism is more proba-
ble than not”. I will not dispute that conclusion, as others 
have done. I will concede that the conclusion is suppor-
ted by Swinburne’s argument and that the argument is in 
fact “good”. I will question, however, the impact of that 
conclusion – with the use of the argument that supports 
it - for the epistemological enterprise of justifying theis-
tic belief, that is, the belief that God exists. Developing 
criticism given by Alvin Plantinga (2001), I will question 
the sufficiency and necessity of Swinburne’s probabilistic 
argument for the epistemic justification of a subject S’s 
belief that God exists, where S is a religious person, say, 
a Christian.
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Resumo 
A conclusão do livro de Swinburne A existência de Deus 
é que “Baseando-se na nossa evidência total, o teísmo é 
mais provável do que não”. Eu não disputarei esta con-
clusão, como outros já têm feito. Eu concederei que a 
conclusão é suportada pelo argumento de Swinburne e 
que o argumento é de fato “bom”. Eu questionarei, en-
tretanto, o impacto desta conclusão – com o uso do ar-
gumento que a suporta – para a tarefa epistemológica de 
justificar a crença teísta, ou seja, a crença de que Deus 
existe. Desenvolvendo crítica oferecida por Alvin Plan-
tinga (2001), eu questionarei a suficiência e a necessi-
dade do argumento probabilístico de Swinburne para a 
justificação epistêmica da crença, de um sujeito S, de que 
Deus existe, onde S é uma pessoa religiosa, digamos, um 
Cristão.
Palavras-chave :Epistemologia da religião. Teologia 
Natural. Justificação do teísmo. Existência de Deus. 
Crença teísta básica.
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE FILOSOFIA DA RELIGIÃO - ABFR
Brazilian Journal for Philosophy of Religion
year I, no. 1, october, 2014
Revista Brasileira de
Filosofia da Religião
Ano I
oN  1
Teologia, Religião e Filosofia da Religião - 
Algumas Distinções a partir de uma Crítica 
a Richard Dawkins
Agnaldo C. Portugal
A filosofia hebraica de Franz Rosenzweig
Maria Cristina Mariante Guarnieri
El ego amans
Entre giro teológico y filosofía de la religión
Germán Vargas Guillén
Uma saída do dilema de Eutífron
Nick Zangwill
É possível discutir ética a partir de 
Temor e Tremor? Possíveis objeções a teses 
kierkegaardianas e seus desdobramentos
Marcio Gimenes de Paula
out. 2014
ISSN 2358-8284
ABFRAssociação Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião
(*) Doutorado em Filosofia pela PUCRS 
com estágio na Rutgers University 
(NJ, EUA). 
Pós-doutorando do Programa de Pós-
Graduação em Filosofia da PUCRS, 
com bolsa PNPD-Capes. 
Áreas de atuação: Epistemologia 
analítica geral, epistemologia da 
religião,  moral e social. 
E-mail: rogeleoliveira@gmail.com
Rogel Esteves de Oliveira 
Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião /  Brasília /  v.2 n.2 / p 117-126 / dez. 2015 / ISSN 2352-8284 118
Richard Swinburne has recognized that his book The Existence of God (1979/2004) 
“is the central book of all that [he has] written on the philosophy of religion” (2004, p. 
v). In fact, that book can be considered a masterpiece of Natural Theology. In it, the au-
thor notoriously claims that, in his sight, there are no “good” deductive arguments for the 
existence of God. (To be “good”, it is not enough that the argument be valid or correct, 
and that its premises be all true: its premises must also be “known to be true by those 
who dispute about the conclusion” (2004, p. 6,7)). For him, there are only good induc-
tive arguments for the existence of God, that is, probabilistic arguments that are strong 
or “correct”, and whose premises are known to be true by all parties. Such probabilistic 
arguments, in fact, should all be considered in a cumulative way, so that they are really 
parts of one good probabilistic argument for the existence of God. In other words, the 
corresponding premises of each inductive argument – cosmological, teleological, etc. - 
should be construed as different pieces of evidence for this single probabilistic argument 
of Natural Theology. This is the project of Swinburne’s book The existence of God: to de-
velop such an argument and to assess its power. What is the conclusion of his book? The 
conclusion is that, even after considering arguments (i.e. evidence) against the existence 
of God, the balance of probability shows that the total evidence increases the probability 
of the existence of God in such a way that the (conditional) probability of the proposition 
“God exists” is higher than the probability of its negation, that is, higher than 0.5 (in a 
range from 0 to 1). In Swinburne’s words: “On our total evidence theism is more probable 
than not” (2004, p. 342).
I will not dispute that conclusion, as others have done.1 I will concede that the con-
clusion is supported by Swinburne’s argument and that the argument is in fact “good”; but 
I will question the impact of that conclusion – with the use of the argument that supports it 
- for the epistemological enterprise of justifying theistic belief, that is, the belief that God 
exists. Developing criticism given by Alvin Plantinga (2001), I will question the suffi-
ciency and necessity of Swinburne’s probabilistic argument for the epistemic justification 
of a subject S’s belief that God exists, where S is a religious person, say, a Christian. In 
doing that, we will assume throughout this paper an internalist conception of epistemic 
justification (henceforth simply justification), that is, a conception of justification that 
appeals to S’s evidence, understood as her mental states (roughly, S’s beliefs and expe-
riences), and where justification of a propositional attitude (belief, disbelief or suspension 
1 See, for example, Braunsteiner-Berger (2014). 
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of judgment) is roughly a matter of having, objectively speaking, the right response to the 
evidence (see Feldman, 2003, p. 45).2 
1 Sufficiency
Is Swinburne’s argument, with its conclusion – the existence of God is more proba-
ble than not, or ‘God exists’ is probable – sufficient for justification of the theistic belief? 
The answer, I will suggest, depends on some elements and presuppositions. Depending 
on how we characterize these elements and presuppositions, we will have what I will call 
different “cases”. In some of these cases, the argument seems sufficient. In others, the 
argument clearly is not sufficient for justification. We will see five cases below. The first 
three are affirmative ones – Swinburne’s argument seems or is sufficient for justification 
of S’s theistic belief. However, I will try to show that these three cases are either incorrect 
in their presuppositions or irrelevant for S’s theistic belief. Cases four and five are clearly 
negative: the argument is not sufficient. 
1.1 The probabilistic belief case:
 In one trivial sense, Swinburne’s argument is sufficient for the justification of the 
probabilistic belief that the existence of God is more probable than not, or more exactly, 
that ‘God exists’ is probable. After all, we are assuming that the argument is good, and 
that S’s belief in the conclusion is caused by the correct use of the argument.  However, 
what is the epistemological relevance of that justified belief – “‘God exists’ is probable” 
– for the justification of S’s belief that God exists? What is the relation between the justi-
fication of “p is probable” and the justification of p? Well, for Swinburne, the belief that 
p is probable entails the belief that p (2001, p. 36; also 1981, p. 5). So when S believes 
that ‘God exists’ is probable, S (logically) believes that God exists. The relation between 
the two beliefs is analytic, logical, even though Swinburne now recognizes that the entail-
ment does not hold in the opposite direction (2001, p. 36, n. 8). So presumably, the justifi-
cation of the first belief – p is probable -, also applies for the second belief - p. However, 
it is disputable, as Swinburne himself recognizes, that believing that p is probable entails 
believing that p! As Plantinga (2001, p. 220,1) points out, when I hear the weatherman 
saying that the probability of rain this afternoon is 0.9, I will not believe that it will rain 
2 Epistemic justification or rationality has to do with the aim of achieving true beliefs. It must be truth-con-
ducive, or indicate (fallibly) that the proposition considered is true. I will not discuss, in this paper, the 
relevance of deductive arguments for epistemic justification of theistic belief, although it is possible to draw 
conclusions, from what I say below, about that.
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this afternoon; I will only believe that it is very likely that it will. Even more controversial 
is to accept that the justification of the probabilistic belief – p is probable - also holds or 
applies for the second belief - p. This issue, however, will be addressed in the third case, 
below. What can be established so far is that, given that we assume that Swinburne’s argu-
ment is good and that S makes correct use of it, S is in fact justified in believing that ‘God 
exists’ is probable. (This result is trivial, given our assumptions). But that is not exactly 
the proposition that is the focus of our investigation. We are not investigating whether S 
is justified in her belief that it is probable that God exists; we investigate, instead, whether 
S is justified in her unqualified belief that God exists.
1.2 The partial belief case: 
We could instead say that Swinburne’s argument is sufficient for the justification of 
S’s belief that God exists, if we think of S as having a partial belief that God exists. In other 
words, assuming degrees of belief or confidence, S could have a degree of confidence (or 
strength of belief, or credence) that God exists that roughly corresponds to the degree of 
probability that Swinburne’s argument indicates concerning God’s existence – even if there 
are no exact numerical values. Swinburne’s argument, therefore, would be sufficient for 
the justification of S’s theistic belief, provided that S “proportioned” her degree of belief to 
the evidence given by the argument. For example, if Swinburne’s argument indicated that 
the probability of God’s existence is about 0.6 or 0.7, S would be justified in believing that 
God exists, based on that argument, if S had in fact a partial belief, with a credence of 0.6 
or 0.7, that God exists. In fact, that is what the “evidentialist” requires of the believer: to 
proportion her belief to the available evidence (Forrest, 2014). However, although all this 
seems plausible, the problem is that this case does not fit very well with S’s being a religious 
person, with full belief or great confidence that God exists and helps her, at least in her best 
moments of religious life. S even learns, from the Bible, that faith requires firmness, stea-
diness (see, for example, James 1:6: “ask in faith, nothing wavering” (KJV))! According to 
the present interpretation, however, such attitude is irrational, unjustified, given Swinbur-
ne’s argument. Swinburne’s argument would instead commend a partial belief that is not 
the attitude S has or seeks to have. The present case, therefore, although interesting for the 
critical evidentialist, does not seem relevant for S. 
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1.3 The weak condition case: 
We can hold that Swinburne’s argument is sufficient for the justification of S’s theis-
tic belief, if we affirm or define that for S to be justified in believing that p it is enough that 
her evidence (acquired and held in a correct way) makes p probable. That is Swinburne’s 
position in fact (see 2001, p. 56). Proposing that S is justified in believing that p if p is 
probable on S’s (good) evidence, Swinburne can defend the justification of S’s theistic 
belief, when it is (correctly) based on the probabilistic argument above. After all, the 
probabilistic argument – we have assumed that - makes the proposition “God exists” 
probable! Why deny justification for S’s theistic belief, if we concede that S made correct 
use of the argument? Well, one can deny justification for S’s theistic belief if one thinks 
that Swinburne’s condition for justification of beliefs is not demanding enough, it is too 
weak. And that seems to be the case. Swinburne’s condition of justification can be correct 
for action, that is, for pragmatic purposes. If S has to act either on the assumption that 
p or on the assumption that not-p, S is justified in acting on the assumption that p if p is 
more probable than not-p (that is, if p is probable). But that is not exactly the case for 
belief, when the purpose is not pragmatic but epistemic, that is, to achieve truth and to 
avoid error. Suspension of judgment is in many cases the correct epistemic response to the 
evidence, even if the balance of probability is not exactly 0.5. As Plantinga reminds us: 
“[A] belief’s being probable, even highly probable, with respect to public evidence, …, 
is insufficient for its being warrantedly believed with any degree of firmness” (2001, p. 
220; his italics). In fact, the famous Lottery Paradox counts against Swinburne’s position 
here. Even if the evidence of the huge number of tickets (say, one million!) makes highly 
probable that my single ticket is not the winner, I am not justified in believing that my 
ticket is not the winner!3 It is true that epistemic justification comes in degrees, and that S 
may have some justification in believing that p when p is probable on her evidence. What 
is being denied, however, is that such degree of justification is enough in order for S to be 
entitled to believe that p; in other words, we deny that S has justification simpliciter for 
her belief. Anyway, even if we concede that intuitions vary here, and that for some people 
S is justified (or rational) in believing that p if S’s evidence (held in a correct way) makes 
p probable, this point is far from being undisputable. 
3 I thank Professor Claudio de Almeida for reminding me of this paradox in this context. For an important 
book concerning this paradox, see Hawthorne (2004).
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1.4 The knowledge case: 
Justification comes in degrees, as we said above. S can be more or less justified 
in her belief that p. For those philosophers who think that (internal) justification is a 
necessary condition for knowledge (along with truth, belief and an anti-Gettier condi-
tion),4 that means that it is not enough to have any degree of justification in order for S to 
have knowledge. S must attain a “knowledge-level” or “knowledge-degree” justification. 
Although it is not easy to determine or specify exactly that degree of justification whi-
ch is “knowledge-level”, virtually all internalist epistemologists agree that justification 
must be strong, robust, “evident” – to use Chisholm’s word (1989) - in order to give you 
knowledge. Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case of S in her theistic belief, if 
all she has is the justification given by Swinburne’s argument. Even if we concede that 
S is (to some degree) justified in her belief that God exists because she has evidence that 
makes the proposition that God exists probable, it is difficult to accept that that evidence 
gives S a knowledge-level justification. To use Chisholm’s word again, S’s evidence must 
make the proposition that God exists “evident”, and not only “probable”, if S is to have 
knowledge. Swinburne’s argument is not sufficient for knowledge-level justification of 
S’s theistic belief. And that is a bad thing for S, since for her (presumably) it is important 
to have knowledge of God, especially knowledge that God exists.
1.5  The full belief case:
Since S is a religious person, it is also important for her that her beliefs about God, 
especially her belief that God exists, have a high degree of confidence. That means that S 
does not seek to have merely a partial belief, but a full or strong belief that God exists. Is 
Swinburne’s argument sufficient for the justification of such a belief? From what was said 
before, it is clear that it is not. Swinburne’s argument - the evidentialist would remind us -, 
justifies S’s theistic belief to the extent that S’s confidence that God exists corresponds to 
the probability given by the argument to that proposition. As we have seen in case (1.2), 
however, Swinburne’s argument justifies a partial belief, not a full one, since its conclu-
sion is merely that the proposition that God exists is probable.
Before considering, in the second part of this paper, the necessity of Swinburne’s 
probabilistic argument for the justification of S’s theistic belief, we have to give some 
remarks about a footnote in the second edition of Swinburne’s The Existence of God. 
4 See Feldman (2003) for an explanation of the Gettier problem and possible anti-Gettier conditions.
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There, on the same page where he gives the conclusion of his book that theism is more 
probable than not, Swinburne adds: “I argue in The Resurrection of God Incarnate that, 
when we take into account the detailed historical evidence about the life, death, and the 
Resurrection of Jesus, the probability that there is a God becomes very much greater than 
that” (2004, p. 342, n. 3). Unfortunately, we do not have space here to discuss that impor-
tant and interesting book. We should point out here, however, that this amendment to the 
conclusion is of course very important for the justification of S’s theistic belief, especially 
concerning cases (1.2) and (1.5) – the partial and full belief cases -, which have to do with 
the degree of confidence with which S holds her belief. It is doubtful, however, whether 
this amendment to the conclusion changes the result of case (1.4) – the knowledge case -, 
where S does not have knowledge-level justification. After all, assuming that God exists 
and that we do not have a Gettier case, it does not seem that S knows that God exists when 
S’s evidence makes her belief, say, very probable. In any case, the results of Swinburne’s 
book The Resurrection of God Incarnate (2003) are very controversial. The conclusion 
that the conditional probability, on the evidence, that Jesus is God Incarnate and that He 
rose from the dead is as high as 0.97 is of course extremely suspicious, even among con-
servative Christian philosophers, like me, that would love that that conclusion were true! 
I suspect – although I do not have space here for this discussion – that the way Swinburne 
establishes his criteria for “prior historical evidence” is the most controversial part.5 To 
be fair with Professor Swinburne, however, his discussion about the importance of back-
ground knowledge or evidence for the whole issue of Jesus’s resurrection and miracles is 
clear and convincing, and the main lesson of that interesting book.
2 Necessity
Assuming that there is no good deductive argument for Natural Theology, and that 
Swinburne’s probabilistic argument for the existence of God encapsulates the good in-
ductive ones – or if you prefer, it is the only good one -, the question now is: Is Swinbur-
ne’s argument, with its conclusion that it is probable that God exists, necessary for the 
justification of S’s theistic belief? In other words, can S justifiably believe that God exists 
without using such an argument of Natural Theology, and even without being aware of 
it and its conclusion?  Here, the answer will be shorter. Two considerations will base a 
negative answer to the issue of the necessity of (Swinburne’s) Natural Theology for the 
justification of S’s theistic belief.
5 For criticisms of this book, see for example Martin (2004).
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2.1. We can plausibly defend that the belief that God exists can be basic, and “pro-
perly basic”, to use Plantinga’s words (2000). That means that S can form and hold the 
belief that God exists without basing her belief on other beliefs (i.e., using an inference 
or argument), but in a direct way, and being justified in doing that (see Plantinga, 2000, 
p. 99ff). The most obvious way would be through religious experience, of varying kinds 
and degrees of strength. We could think, for example, that S – to quote Plantinga again – 
[…] has a rich inner spiritual life…; it seems to her that she is sometimes made aware, 
catches a glimpse, of something of the overwhelming beauty and loveliness of the Lord; 
she is often aware, as it strongly seems to her, of the work of the Holy Spirit in her heart, 
comforting, encouraging, teaching, leading her to accept the ‘great things of the gospel’ (as 
Edwards calls them), helping her see that the magnificent scheme of salvation devised by 
the Lord himself is not only for others but for her as well (2000, p. 100f).
We could think that S forms her belief that God exists as a direct response to such ex-
periences, without using an argument of the form: “I have had such and such experiences. 
The best explanation for those experiences is that God exists. Therefore, God exists” (see also 
Alston, 1991, p. 3). Her theistic belief would be basic analogously to the case of other per-
ceptual beliefs, based, for example, on sense experience. But could theistic belief be justified 
in this basic way? Could we consider the religious experience good evidence or evidence at 
all?6 Why not? Since we are working here with an internalist notion of justification, we will 
not appeal to “reliabilist” or even “proper function” accounts of justification or warrant. It is 
enough to point out, however, that it seems completely arbitrary not to include religious ex-
perience among S’s kinds of evidence. Is it because it is private and not public that it should 
be disregarded? But virtually all epistemologists would agree that among the legitimate kinds 
of evidence available for a subject, some are private and others are public. To be exact, sense 
experience is private! Moreover, we should not forget that many people share the kind of reli-
gious experience S is told to have above! Does not S justifiably believe, then, that God exists 
based on her compelling and repeated experience that God exists?7 If S has strong or com-
pelling experience as if p – we could say, as well, strong inclination to believe or appearance 
that p -, it seems correct, in an internalist sense, to claim that S is justified in believing that p, at 
least prima facie justified. In other words, there is no other correct response to that evidence, 
besides believing that p. That is something that even Swinburne seems to accept, when he 
talks about his “Principle of Credulity” (2001, p. 141; see also Huemer, 2007). 
6 I am assuming throughout this paper that evidence can be experiences and not only beliefs based on them.
7 If you prefer, instead of saying that S has experience that God exists, we could say that S has experience 
as if God exists. We should also point out that the experience can be about other proposition that obviously 
implies the existence of God, as the experience as if God spoke to me.
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If all we said above is correct, we have a decisive reason to deny that Swinburne’s 
probabilistic argument – and, in fact, any other argument of Natural Theology – is ne-
cessary for the justification of S’s theistic belief. S’s theistic belief can be “properly” or 
“rightly” basic.
2.2 A second consideration to deny that necessity is that to require an argument like 
Swinburne’s, in order for S to be justified in her theistic belief, seems too demanding. 
Relatively few people – of many who believe that God exists - would be acquainted with 
such an argument and even fewer people would be able to follow all the steps of the 
probabilistic argument, even in a popular version. It does not seem correct to say that all 
these people are not justified in their theistic belief. Imagine if people were required to 
have analogous arguments for the belief that external objects exist! 
Swinburne himself recognizes that what is required for a “religious way” is only a 
kind of “weak belief” (1981, p. 163). He means by that that people do not need to believe 
(justifiably) that the existence of God is more probable than not (“strong belief”), that is, 
they do not need to believe the conclusion of his probabilistic argument in order to follow 
a religious way – that would be too much. What they need is to believe (justifiably) that 
the existence of God is more probable than any other alternative that is incompatible with 
it, for example, Buddhism (that would be “weak belief”). In this way, instead of justifia-
bly believing that p (=God exists) is more probable than not-p, what is necessary for a 
religious way is to believe justifiably that p is more probable than q, r, s, etc., where q, r, 
s, etc. are alternatives to p. However, that still seems too demanding for the majority of 
people! How many religious people have undertaken such a task? How many are able to 
do that, even with the help of masters? Even this “weak” kind of belief – with the jus-
tification that it requires - seems too strong, being difficult to accept that it should be a 
necessary condition for the justification of S’s theistic belief. 8 
3 Conclusion
If we are correct in what we said above, Swinburne’s Natural Theology – that is, 
his probabilistic argument for the existence God – is neither sufficient, in some relevant 
senses, nor necessary for the justification of S’s theistic belief. To affirm this conclusion, 
however, is not the same as to affirm that his probabilistic argument is not correct or even 
8 Note that in one sense, seen in the first part, Swinburne’s condition for the justification of theistic belief 
is too weak, when it says that S is justified in believing p when her (good) evidence makes p probable. In 
the other sense, however, it is too strong, when it says that S has to believe that p is more probable than any 
alternative to p.
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good. Personally, I think Swinburne’s impressive work undertaken in the book The Exis-
tence of God is a serious challenge to the confident atheist and to the person who refuses 
to consider the question of God’s existence. Our conclusion, if correct, only shows the 
limits of what such an argument can do, epistemically speaking. 
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